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Civil Procedure
Righting Past Wrongs or Interfering in International
Relations? World War H-Era Slave Labor Victims Receive
State Legal Standing After Fifty Years
Diane RichardFoos

Code Sections Affected
Code of Civil Procedure § 354.6 (new).

SB 1245 (Hayden); 1999 STAT. Ch. 216 (Effective July 28, 1999)
My friends, I am under no illusions. Compared to the enormity of the evil

visited upon the Jewish people by the Nazi war machine, these efforts
constitute mere drops of justice. But, it is my hope that, one day, these
drops ofjustice willfar outnumberthe tears ofsorrow thataccompany our
memories.'

I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to and during the Second World War, about seven million slave

laborers were forced to work in Nazi Germany.2 No German company was required
to use slave laborers under Hitler, but such companies readily preyed upon the slave

1. Governor Gray Davis, speech at Yom Hashoah (Remembrance Day) Event II, Pan Pacific Park, Los
Angeles, California (Apr. 18, 1999) (visited Aug. 4, 1999) <httpl/www.ca.gov/slgovernor/rmkshashoah.htm>
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see id. (referring to Governor Davis' high priority of 'justice in
the defense of human rights," particularly his involvement in a statewide campaign to resolve victims' insurance
claims and an action brought by the Simon Wiesenthal Center against firms that exploited slave labor during
World War II).

2. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 216, sec. 1(b), at 1854; Letter from Lewis M. Barth, Dean, Hebrew Union
College-Jewish Institute of Religion, to the Honorable Adam Schiff (Mar. 26, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); Letter from Michael Beal, Rabbi, B'Nai Tikvah Congregation, to the Honorable Adam Schiff (Mar.
19, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Letter from Si Frumkin, Chairman, Southern California
Council for Soviet Jews, to the Honorable Tom Hayden (Jan. 29, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
Letter from Dr. Robert Kirschner, Program Director, Skirbal Cultural Center, to the Honorable Adam Schiff (Mar.
31, 1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Letter from Nathan Pollak to the Honorable Adam Schiff
(Mar. 29,1999) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Letter from Harriet A. Rothenberg, State Public Affairs
Chair, National Council of Jewish Women, to the Honorable Tom Hayden (Feb. 12, 1999) (on file with the
McGeorgeLaw Review); Letter from Barbra Streisand to the Honorable Tom Hayden (Feb. 22, 1999) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review). Hereinafter, this Note will refer to this collection of letters as "Letters."
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laborers, and the slaves were a significant part of the workforce. Throughout the
Holocaust, 4 many millions of slave laborers were murdered, but thousands
survived. s Today, California
is home to many victims of Nazi persecution and the
6
heirs of those victims.
Some of these victims have recently filed lawsuits against particular
corporations that allegedly have retained illicit profits from World War f-era slave
labor.7 These plaintiffs are pursuing compensation for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and the victims' unpaid efforts.8 The text of one complaint
provides a victim's recollection of being forced to sort through the "personal
possessions [of prisoners] for precious metal items to be re-smelted." 9 Other
complaints describe the experiences of victims who worked seven days a week,

fourteen hours a day, under brutal conditions, often without shoes or sufficient
nourishment.10 Additionally, some accounts describe five-mile walks to work
everyday, and "on the spot executions" for individuals who could not meet
expectations."

3.
Denis Staunton, German Firms Set up Fundfor Victims of Slave Labour,THE IJSH TimEs (Berlin),
Feb. 17, 1999, at 10, availablein 1999 WL 12323930. But see Letter from Gavin McHugh, Senior Vice President,
California Manufacturer's Association, to the Honorable Tom Hayden (May 17,1999) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (expressing concern that Chapter216 could "inappropriately be deemed to apply to affiliates of nonGerman companies that were seized by the Nazi government" referencing Ford Motor Company in particular,
and concluding that "whatever occurred at the facilities of U.S. affiliates seized by Nazis was and is the
responsibility of the German government, as successor to the Nazi regime").
4. See Simon 'Wiesenthal Center, 36 Questions About the Holocaust (visited Aug. 4, 1999)
<http://wwv.wiesenthal.com/resource/36questl.htmil> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (specifying
that the term "Holocaust" refers to "the period from January 30, 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor of
Germany, to May 8, 1945 (V-E Day), the end of the war in Europe").
5.
Fee L (recognizing that according to most authorities, approximately six million Jews were victims
of the Nazi Holocaust); Letters, supranote 2 (stating that most of the slave laborers died, but thousands survived).
6.
1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 216, see. 1(a), at 1854 (West).
7.
See Governor Gray Davis, GovernorDavis JoinsHolocaustLawsuit, Press Release PR99:074, Mar.
31, 1999 [hereinafter Davis Press Release] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that
Governor Gray Davis has joined a lawsuit brought by the Simon Wiesenthal Center and several California
residents against various companies doing business in California, including Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Deutsche
Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG, Commerzbank AG, VIAG, General Motors Corporation, and Ford Motor Company,
alleging retention of "illicit profits from Nazi slave labor"); Henry Weinstein, 5 HolocaustSurvivorsSue German
Firm over S!ave Labor, L. A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at AI5 (mentioning that in Newark, New Jersey, numerous
class action suits prompted by similar allegations have been filed in federal court against companies such as
Phillip Holzman AG, a lucrative corporation that does significant business in California and other parts of the
United States); Law Offices of Shernoff, Bidart, Darras & Arkin, Slave Labor Lawsuit Filed on Behalf of
Holocaust Victims, Press Release, Mar. 5, 1999 [hereinafter Shernoff Press Release] (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (describing a lawsuit filed by six California residents against billionaire corporation
Phillip Holznan AG, a premiere German construction company with subsidiaries in the United States, including
California-based Holzman USA and Metric Constructors, Inc., seeking damages for unfair business practices, for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for the value of services performed).
8.
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CO9rTTEEANALYSiS oFSB 1245, at 2 (May 18, 1999).
9.
Davis PressRelease, supra note 7.
10. ShernoffPressRelease, supra note 7.
11. Id.
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The defendants claim that United States courts have no jurisdiction to hear
these cases and, "even if they did, the statute of limitations has expired." 12 Chapter
216 thwarts these arguments and strengthens the hands of World War H-era slave

labor victims who may feel that compensation from a common survivor fund in lieu
of individual lawsuits is insufficient.' 3 Chapter 216 forces firms to respond to
to settle cases
individual and class action claims, providing an incentive to the firms 14

in order to avoid costly lawsuits accompanied by negative publicity.
Furthermore, although Chapter 216 was originally developed with Holocaust
survivors in mind, it also applies to former prisoners of war (POWs) who suffered
at the hands of Japanese-based corporations during World War H.15 In addition to
economic redress, some former POWs are seeking injunctions that would bar

in America, a request that, if
certain Japanese companies from doing business
16
fulfilled, "could shake the Japanese economy."'

11. BACKGROUND
A. PriorRoadblocks for World War II-EraSlave Lawsuits
After World War 11, various treaties and agreements were executed in order to
resolve the conflict with Germany and its allies and to consider reparations. 7

Advocates for the victims argue that suits against German companies were deferred
until the culmination of the reparations phase, which was marked by the ratification

of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty in 1991.18 This theory suggests that the statute of

12. Henry Weinstein, Bill Signed BolsteringHolocaust-EraClaims, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1999, at A3.
13. Weinstein, supranote 12, at A3.
14. Id.
15. Ann W. O'Neill, POW Files Suitfor CompensationLaw, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, at BI; see id.
(highlighting the story of Lester I. Tenney, a former POW and current California resident, who has filed a Chapter
216 test case in Los Angeles Superior Court against defendants Mitsui & Co., Ltd. of Japan and New York, and
Mitsui Mining Co., alleging "unconscionable exploitation" of prisoners and seeking recovery on claims of slavery,
forced labor, infliction of emotional distress, and civil assault and battery).
16. Mike Carter, Bitter Ex-POW Sues His Tormenters, SEATrLETIMES, Sept. 16, 1999, at Al; see, e.g.,
id. (describing the experiences of Frank Mace, one of eleven plaintiffs in a federal lawsuit filed in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, against Nippon Steel, Kawasaki, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Showa Denki, Japanese companies with
collective yearly American sales of $300 billion).
17. E.g., Agreement on a Plan for Allocation of a Reparation Share to Nonrepatriable Victims of German
Action, June 14,1946, U.S-Fr.-U.K.-Czech.-Yugo.,4 U.S.T. 75 [hereinafter Paris Reparations Treaty]; Agreement
on German External Debts, Feb. 27,1953, U.S.-Belg.-Can.-Ceylon-Den.-Fr. Republic-Greece-Iran-Ir.-Italy-Liech.Lux.-Pak.-Spain-Swed.-Switz.-S. Afr.-Gr. Brit.-N. Ir.-Yugo. [hereinafter London Agreement]; Convention on the
Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, May 26, 1952, U.K.-N. Ir.-Fr.-U.S-F.R.G., 332
U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter The Transition Agreement]; Termination of Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect
to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, U.S.-F.R.G.-G.D.L-Fr.-U.S.S.R.-U.K., 29 LL.M. 1186 [hereinafter Two-Plus-Four
Treaty].
18. See SENATE COMMIITEE ON RULES, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 1245, at 4 (July 12, 1999) (stating that
the Two-Plus-Four Treaty effectuated by East Germany, West Germany, and the four Allied powers brought the
reparations phase of the Second World War to an absolute end, thus reversing the moratorium on the assertion of
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limitations on wartime claims against German companies was tolled until a German
court ruling ended the moratorium on November 7, 1997.9 Attorneys for the
defendants disagree, and argue that all individual actions arising out of World War
I were completely subsumed by the Paris Reparations Treaty.20 Federal district
judges in Newark, New Jersey, recently dismissed two similar lawsuits, holding,

inter alia, that these issues are not for federal courts to decide because they are
better left to the political branches of government.
B. Slave Labor ReparationsFund

In February 1999, a dozen German corporations that admittedly exploited slave

labor during the Second World War established a fund for victims of slave labor.2
The fund continues to grow, and is now supported by more than 100 German
firms.23 Some American firms are charged with the exploitation of slave labor as
well, but these firms did not participate in the development of the fund despite

urging from victims' representatives.24 The function of the German foundation plan
is to "counter lawsuits," particularly class action lawsuits filed in the United States,
and to "remove the basis of the campaign being led against German industry." 5 The
initiative, when compared with lengthy lawsuits, is seen by German industry as a
26
more efficient method of compensation, in light of the ages of the victims.
This fund, however, will be accessible to former slave laborers only if
international negotiators agree to preclude lawsuits against German firms for their
actions during World War .'27International negotiators representing the German
firms and the German government participated in fairly closed discussions with

claims prescibed by the London Agreement); id. (explaining that the actions were first deferred by the Pais
Regulations Treaty in 1946, and then by the London Agreement on German External Debt in 1953); see also

Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (D.NJ. 1999) (contending that individual slave labor
claims "never were and never were intended to be subsumed under the series of treaties and agreements following
the end of World War II").
19. See SENATECOMMmnFEONRULEsFLOORANALYSiSOFSB 1245,at4 (July 14, 1999) (indicating that
Chapter 216 codifies the ruling of the German court ending the moratorium on claims brought by victims of Nazi
persecution).
20. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,455-56 (D.NJ. 1999).
21. Id. at 483-89; Burger-Fischer, 65F. Supp. 2d at 282.
22. Staunton, supranote 3, at 10.
23. German Industry FarShort of Goalfor Nazi Slave Labor Compensation,AGENC-E FRANCE-PRESSE,
Jan. 7,2000, availablein 2000 WL 2708607.
24. Ran Grossman, Germans OK Paying $5 Billion to War Slaves: Deal Puts Pressures on U.S.
Corporatiom, CHI.TRIB., Dec. 15,1999, at 1,availablein 1999 WL2941695. But see Charles Babington, Clinton
Sends Team to Help with Settlement for Nazi Labor Camp Survivors, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1999, at A32,
availablein 1999 WL 30308703 (stating that since the establishment of the fund amount, American car makcrs
Ford and General Motors have been contemplating contributions).
25. Staunton, supranote 3, at 10 (quoting German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder).
26. Id.
27. Weinstein, supra note 12, at A3. But cf. id. (stating that German companies "want an agreement
between governments rather than a court settlement").
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representatives of the United States government throughout 1999, in hopes of
reaching an agreement that could bestow compensation upon approximately
240,OO0 surviving slave laborers worldwide.29 December 14, 1999, marked the
turning point in these negotiations when an agreement was reached, capping

German contributions at $5.2 billion.30 Talks are still underway between the parties,
and the agreement will not become official until remaining details are settled.3'

Political leaders from Germany and the United States
embrace the plan,32 while
' 33
plaintiffs' lawyers remain "cautiously optimistic.
The fund was originally deemed unacceptable by the World Jewish Congress
and by attorneys who have filed class action suits on behalf of Holocaust-era slave
labor victims against German companies. 34 If the plan fails, some United States

leaders urge the imposition of sanctions upon German commodities.3 ' Germany
threatens to bring any imposition of penalties to the attention of the World Trade

Organization. 6 This type of conflict could cultivate a trade war along with
accompanying political strain.37

28. Babington, supranote 24, at A32.
29. Weinstein, supra note 12, at A3; Germans Offer $3.3B to Laborers,AssOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Oct.
8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 28126107 (noting that a past offer by Germany of $3.3 billion was insulting to
advocates of victims); U.S., Germany Agree on ReparationsFund, RUBBER & PLASTICS NEWS, Dec. 20, 1999,
at 3 (noting a rejection of a subsequent $4.2 billion offer); see also Weinstein (indicating that the German
companies had hoped to arrive at an agreement by September 1, 1999, the sixtieth anniversary of the initiation
of World War 1I,despite critics' claims that a myriad of unresolved issues remained and that the goal was
unrealistic).
30. Stewart Eizenstat, White House PressBriefing, U.S. NEWSWIRE, December 15,1999, availablein 1999
WL 22284469.
31. DraftBill on SlaveLabor CompensationSetforFebruary,AGENCE.FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 5,2000,available
in 2000 WL 2707325; see id. (discussing unresolved issues of overlapping compensation and the compensatory
distinction between slave laborers, "who were to be worked to death," and forced laborers, "who were considered
Nazi assets and received better treatment"); Burt Herman, Nazi Victims Rip CompensationPlan: Unfairto Jewish
Slave Labor Claimants, Lawyers Say, Cm.SUN-TIMES, Dec. 17, 1999, at 64, available in 1999 WL 6571073
(explaining the need for the German Legislature to enact legislation before payments to victims can begin); see
also Babington, supra note 24, at A32 (estimating settlement payouts at approximately $8,000 each for slave
laborers and between $2,000 and $3,000 each for forced laborers).
32. See Clinton SupportsGerman Offer to Nazi Slave LaborVictims, AGENcEFR.-PREssE, Dec. 15, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 25162646 (quoting President Bill Clinton, who referred to the plan as "an extraordinary
achievement"); id.(citing German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's hope to do all he can "to provide legal
finality").
33. Grossman, supranote 24, at 1.
34. Weinstein, supranote 12, at A3.
35. E.g., Germany Warns of Possible Tensions with U.S. over HolocaustSlave-Labor Claims, HA'ARTZ
DAILY NEWSPAPER LTD. (Tel Aviv, Isr.), Oct. 3, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 1747586.
36. l
37. L (citing Germany's chief mediator, Otto Graf Lambsdorf).
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C. Statutes of LimitationsIssues

The plaintiffs contend that statutes for all slave labor claims began to run
on November 7, 1997.8 If this interpretation is correct, World War H-era slave
labor claims brought under California's tort or contract statutes expired on
November 7, 1998, and November 7, 1999, respectively. Prior to the enactment of
Chapter 216, no exceptions existed for the applicable statutes of limitations for
Holocaust slave labor survivor suits.3 9
III. CHAPTER 216
4
0
Chapter 216 provides that any World War 11 slave or forced labor victim, '
or heir of such slave or victim, may initiate proceedings to recoup compensation,42
including interest, for work completed without pay between 1929 and 1945, against
any entity or successor in interest thereof for whom the labor was performed. 43 It
also allows for the initiation of a suit in a superior court of California and provides
for that court to retain jurisdiction over the case until its culmination.44
Additionally, Chapter 216 extends the statute of limitations, retroactively,45 for such
claims until December 31, 2010.46

38. Supra text accompanying note 19.
39. See CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 339-40 (West Supp. 2000) (lacking an exception to the statute of
limitations for World War Il-em slave labor victim cases). But see id. § 354.5(c) (West Supp. 2000) (extending
the statute of limitations until December 31, 2010, for Holocaust victims or their heirs or beneficiaries, who have
claims arising out of insurance policies purchased in Europe during World War II).
40. See id. § 354.6(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 216) (defining "Second World War slave labor victim" as
any individual removed from concentration camp or ghetto or averted from transferral to a concentration camp
or from a ghetto to perform uncompensated labor for any length of time between 1929 and 1945, "by the Nazi
regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under
control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers").
41. Id. § 354.6(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 216) (stating that the definition for "Second World War forced
labor victim" is any civilian belonging to a population overcome "by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers,
or prisoner-of-war of the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers," compelled to provide uncompensated labor for
any interval of time between 1929 and 1945, "by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises
transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and
sympathizers").
42. ld. § 354.6(a)(3) (enacted by Chapter 216) (defining "compensation" as "the present value of wages
and benefits that individuals should have been paid and damages for injuries sustained in connection with the
labor performed," and indicating that "present value shall be calculated on the basis of market value of the services
at the time they were performed, plus interest from the time the services were performed, compounded annually
to date of full payment without diminution for wartime or postwar currency devaluation").
43. Id § 354.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 216); see id. (adding that the work could have been performed
"either directly or through a subsidiary or an affiliate").
44. Id.
45. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 216, sec. l(d), at 1854 (West).
46. CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 354.6(c) (enacted by Chapter 216); see also US Senators Present Bill to
Compensate Nazi Forced Laborers, AGENCE FR.-PRE SE, Nov. 5, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25138337
(describing a similar bill introduced in the U.S. Senate in November 1999).
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Chapter 216 gives California superior courts jurisdiction over actions brought
by victims or heirs seeking redress for slave or forced labor performed during
World War II against "any entity or successor . . . for whom the labor was

performed, either directly, or through a subsidiary or affiliate." 47 California law
provides a one-year statute of limitations for an action of "assault, battery, false
imprisonment... or for injury to or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of another."4 In addition, a two-year statute of limitations applies to
actions based on "contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument
of writing.' 9 Chapter 216 provides that World War I slave or forced labor claims
will not be dismissed for tolled statutes of limitations if the suits are brought on or
before December 31, 2010. 50
With Chapter 216, the California Legislature intends to establish further public
policy in additional instances of demonstrated slave labor exploitation by
companies currently conducting business in the State.5' The Legislature also plans
to put mechanisms in place to monitor State pension fund investments in
corporations
owing remuneration to victims of World War 11-era slave and forced
52
labor.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 216

Chapter 216 is ambiguous as to whether it provides both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction over World War 1-era slave labor and forced labor claims.
The statute uses language that is typically employed in reference to subject matter
jurisdiction.53

47. Id. § 354.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 216).
48. Id. § 340(3) (West Supp. 2000).
49. Id. § 339(1) (West Supp. 2000).
50. Id. § 354.6(c) (enacted by Chapter 216).
51. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 216, sec. 2, at 1854.
52. See id., sec. 3, at 1854 (requiring that the Treasurer, the Public Employees' Retirement System, and
the State Teachers' Retirement System monitor investments in such companies and report the findings to the
Legislature).
53. See 2 B. E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Jurisdiction § 10 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that subject
matter jurisdiction has been known as jurisdiction of the court over the amount in controversy or the type of case,
and referencing the Second Restatement of Judgments in its definition of subject matter jurisdiction as "a court's
competency to decide the issue before it," as opposed to "territorial jurisdiction[, which is] ... the state's
jurisdiction over a particular person, thing or status" (emphasis added)). CompareCAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6
(enacted by Chapter 216) (lacking clarification of the word 'jurisdiction"), with Greener v. Workers' Comp. App.
Bd., 6 Cal. 4th 1028, 1035, 863 P.2d 784, 787, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 539, 542 (1993) (defining subject matter
jurisdiction as "the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way" (emphasis added)).
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A. Subject MatterJurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction gives the court authority over a proceeding.5 4 It is
often known as jurisdiction "in the fundamental or strict sense," or the "power to
hear or determine the case." 55 California superior courts have original jurisdiction
in all cases except those specifically withheld from them by the state constitution. 6
Upon initial examination, the California Legislature's attempt to grant subject
matter jurisdiction and extend the statute of limitations for the survivors' claims in
State superior courts is permissible, as neither act appears to conflict with any
provisions of the California or United States constitutions.57
However, once the superior court has the claim in court, the constitutionality
of the Legislature's bestowing jurisdiction on the court will depend on how the
court hearing the case interprets the post-World War II series of treaties that were
created in hopes of reconciling conflict and addressing reparations between
Germany and its allies.58 If the court hearing the case determines that the treaties
only deferred the claims, then a court's extension of the statute of limitations and
hearing of the claims is not unconstitutional under either the California or United
States Constitution.5 ' However, if the court holds that the treaties subsumed
individual claims permanently, no statute of limitations will exist to extend, and to
hear the claims would be in direct conflict with the World War IIreparations
treaties; such would be a federal constitutional violation under the Supremacy
Clause. 6'
In addition, if the current international negotiations61 produce an agreement or
treaty specifically barring claims made by individuals against private corporations,
the future treaty will supersede all actions by the California Legislature to the extent
that the actions are in conflict with the treaty.62

54.

Greenerat 1034,863 P.2d at 787,25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 542.

55. Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280,288, 109 E2d 942,947 (1941).
56. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 10.
57. SENATE JuDICtARY COMMITEE, COMMITiEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1245, at 9 (May 18, 1999); see U.S.
CONST. amend. X (stating that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"); supra text accompanying note 38

(specifying the jurisdiction of the superior courts under the California Constitution).
58. Supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.

59. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (declaring that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"); supra
text accompanying note 40 (recapitulating the subject matter over which California's trial courts have personal

jurisdiction pursuant to the State constitution).
60. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (mandating that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"); see also Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (rejecting the claim that the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty

concepts narrow the scope of the treaty power).
61. Supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
62. Supra note 60.
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B. PersonalJurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction is decided by a party's legal existence and its presence or
other conduct in the state. 63 In California, courts may exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant on any basis consistent with the constitutions of the State and the United
States.6' Due process permits state courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresidents where "minimum contacts" exist between the forum state and the nonresident. 5 "To justify the court's assumption ofjurisdiction, the defendant's activity
must consist of some act or transaction in the forum state 'by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."" Nevertheless, if the
contacts of a non-resident defendant with the State of California are "substantial,
continuous, and systematic," a court will have general jurisdiction over the
defendant, even for completely unrelated activities. 67
If the language in Chapter 216 with respect to jurisdiction is limited to subject
matterjurisdiction only, the ambiguous language is irrelevant to the primary actions
expected to be brought. Thus far, the defendants being sued in California are all
doing business in California, and hence have subjected themselves to general
personal jurisdiction in California through their continuous and systematic contacts
with the State.6 Should a defendant not have general or specific contacts with
California, the California courts will not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, because to claim personal jurisdiction in such a case would be
inconsistent with the constitutions of California and the United States.6 9
Once it finds contacts, a court must determine whether jurisdiction is feasible
by balancing the burden to the defendant against the benefit to the plaintiff, coupled
with the interest of the State in assuming jurisdiction. ° The defendants in these
cases are large, multinational corporations doing business in California. 1 California
is home to many of the plaintiffs, all of whom are in their sixties, seventies, and

63. Greener,6 Cal. 4th at 1034-35,863 P.2d at 787,25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 542.
64. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
65. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see id. (declaring the "minimum
contacts" standard to be satisfied when the exercise of jurisdiction over the non-resident does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice").
66. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 898, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118
(1969).
67. Corneilson v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 147,545 P.2d 264,266, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (1976).
68. See supra note 7 (identifying the defendants in some California lawsuits, and specifying these
defendants' contacts with the State).
69. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
70. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 899,458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118

(1969).
71. See supra note 7 (listing the defendants, noting their size, and indicating that they do business in
California).
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eighties.72 One can legitimately argue that any inconvenience to the defendant
corporations would be outweighed by the plaintiffs' interests in not having to return
to Germany fifty years after the War, which would further refresh their gladly
dampened memories. On the other hand, some argue that California's interest in
opposition to Chapter 216 is high, because Chapter 216 will turn California's
judicial system into an international court of justice, resulting in overloads and
slowdowns.73
C. Forum Non Conveniens
Once a court finds personal jurisdiction, it still has the discretion to apply the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. The California doctrine of forum non conveniens
states that after determining that the alternate forum is a "suitable place for trial,"
a court should analyze a number of private and public factors to determine if trial
in California is appropriate.74 The private interest factors are "ease of access to
sources of proof, the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses."75 The public interest
factors include "avoidance of overburdening local courts with congested calendars,
protecting the interests of potential jurors so that they are not called upon to decide
the cases in which the local community has little concern, and weighing the
competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation. 76
One could plausibly argue that justice would be better served if World War II slave
or forced labor actions were brought and tried in Germany, because such would
provide easier access to physical locations where events took place. However, more
compelling reasons exist as to why the suits should be tried in California; for
example, having the suits in California would give increased access to witnessvictims, would be less burdensome for the elderly survivors, and would be logical
given the level of interest in this State.
D. Reawakening Otherwise Time-BarredSuits
Chapter 216 allows plaintiffs to bring "otherwise time-barred suits."" Statutes
of limitations are more of a "legislative grace" than a "fundamental right., 78 They

72.

Supra note 2 and accompanying text.

73. See SENATEJUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMrTrESANALYSIS oFSB 1245,at 9 (May 18, 1999) (arguing
that the policy provisions of the bill are potentially far-reaching, and questioning whether the California court
system is equipped to handle all of the cases that may arise as a result of a World War I-era slave labor victims

moving to California).
74. Stangvik v. Shiley, 54 Cal. 3d. 744,751,819 P.2d 14, 17-18, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 556, 559-60 (1991).
75. Id., 819 P.2d at 17-18, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559.
76. cL, 819"P.2d at 17-18, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559-60.
77. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITEE, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1245, at 6 (May 18, 1999).
78. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
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are subject to a "large degree of legislative control." 79 Policies behind statutes of
limitations include putting the adversary on notice and giving the defendant the
right to be free of stale claims.80
Because World War 11 survivors of slave and forced labor often have very
painful memories, these memories are not likely to fade completely in their
lifetimes 8' despite the passage of fifty years.82 In addition, the defendants are
certainly on notice as to the claims, as they are actively negotiating with the United
States to prevent litigation, preferring to offer lump compensation from a common
fund.8 3 As the author of Chapter 216 states, the new law
sends a very powerful message from California to the U.S. government and
the German government, who are in the midst of rather closed negotiations
about a settlement. If the international negotiators want to avoid very
expensive litigation by survivors as well as very bad public relations for
companies[,] ... they ought to settle ....Otherwise, this law allows us to
go ahead and take them to court.8'
Chapter 216 has received much publicity, and regardless of whether the plaintiffs
are successful in court, this law is an incentive for international negotiators and
involved corporations to take World War 1-era slave labor compensation seriously,
and to work toward an expedient settlement that is agreeable to all parties.
Also, Chapter 216 may be criticized for dismissing the policy rationale behind
statutes of limitation. 5 However, extending the statutes is within the realm of
legislative power and is not a violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights,
8 6
barring preemption by a past or future treaty or agreement.
E. Impacts of BroadPolicy Provisions
In passing Chapter 216, the Legislature expressed broad intentions of
enacting additional policy as necessary to compensate any California resident who
is a proven victim of World War fl-era slave labor practices of any company

79. Id.
80. Order of R.R. Tels. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
81. See generallysupranotes 2-11 and accompanying text (describing the difficult, and hence unpleasantly
memorable, experiences of slave laborers in Nazi Germany prior to and during the Second World War).

82. See Letters, supranote 2 (indicating the ages of the victims).
83. See supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text (describing efforts to establish a fund and discussing
negotiations between the German and United States governments to this effect).
84. Weinstein, supranote 12, at A3 (quoting Senator Tom Hayden).
85. Supra text accompanying note 80.
86. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Supremacy Clause, and indicating that
a past or future treaty would supersede California law if a court found a conflict).
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currently doing business in the State.87 By establishing mechanisms to monitor State
pension fund investments in corporations owing remuneration to victims of
Holocaust-era slave labor, the Legislature may be suggesting the possibility of a
divestiture bill, an alternative that has had serious financial ramifications on
targeted corporations in the past.88
V. CONCLUSION

If the courts ultimately interpret the series of World War II reparations treaties
to stall individual World War II slave and forced labor claims against private
corporations as opposed to simply barring them, then the Legislature presumably
will have been within its rights in enacting Chapter 216.8 However, if the treaties
are interpreted to subsume individual claims, then the treaties themselves are in
conflict with Chapter 216, and the new law is vulnerable to constitutional attack. 0
Chapter 216 reflects the California Legislature's commitment to securing
compensation for Nazi slave labor victims. 91 Assuming it is not preempted by the

U.S. Constitution's Supremacy ClauseP due to a conflict with past or future treaties
or agreements, Chapter 216 will put California and the United States in a better
bargaining position to ensure that victims of World War 1-era slave labor are
represented as ambitiously as possible. 93

87.

1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 216, sec. 2, at 1854.

88. See 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1254, §§ 16640-50, at 4386-91 (exemplifying an occasion on which the
Legislatur used a divestiture bill as a means of taking a stance on the issue of apartheid in South Africa in 1986,

which led to the withdrawal of billions of dollars worth of Public Employees Retirement System investments in
companies that did business in South Africa).
89. Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
90. Supra note 60 and accompanying text.
91. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 216, sec. 1-2, at 1854.
92. Supra note 60.
93. Text accompanying supra note 84.

